



**ASPEN FORUM ON AMERICAN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS**  
*Post-Forum Report*

*March 23 – March 26*  
*Aspen, Colorado*

*Senator Rob Portman & Brian Deese, Co-Chairs*

*Cina Vazir, Rapporteur*

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## Introduction

The Aspen Institute Energy and Environment Program convened a group of leaders from government, business, and nonprofits in March 2025 for a four-day forum to discuss the future of American economic competitiveness. This report summarizes the key findings from the discussion. While the text below attempts to represent the consensus views expressed, it does not capture every view expressed.

In the context of a shifting world order, the United States faces new challenges and rising stakes to reinforce its economic competitiveness. Industrial policy, energy, trade, and supply chain resilience are already playing a heightened role in geopolitical and economic competition. How can the United States implement policies in these areas to enhance American economic competitiveness? And what is the ultimate purpose of American economic competitiveness?

Participants in Aspen explored the core components of a national competitiveness strategy and worked to identify opportunities for bipartisan progress. The discussion acknowledged the constraints of political polarization and tried to find areas of common ground. Key findings from the forum are summarized in the five guiding principles below.

1. American economic competitiveness should serve to improve the lives of the average citizen and protect the integrity of core American values.
2. The United States needs a more predictable policy environment to promote capital investment.
3. The trajectory of broad-based, higher tariffs may pose challenges to America's geopolitical and economic position and would benefit from a more targeted approach.
4. The U.S. government will need to invest heavily in its innovation ecosystem, including national labs, universities, and early-stage technologies, to lead in strategic industries of the future.
5. Rising electricity demand and economic competitiveness are intertwined challenges that U.S. policymakers, industry, and civil society can address through a wide mix of solutions, including incentivizing innovation in the power sector, expanding gas-fired generation equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and adopting a cautiously optimistic approach to nuclear energy.

**1. American economic competitiveness should serve to improve the lives of the average citizen and protect the integrity of core American values.**

America's place in the world is the most uncertain since the end of the Cold War. Competition with China, the rise of Middle Powers, and polarization at home cast uncertainty over the United States' economic and geopolitical position. There are also profound questions over whether the future global order will be unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, or something entirely different. America will need to be competitive economically to protect its interests. But what exactly are those interests? If economic competitiveness is the means, what is the end?

Participants in Aspen generally agreed that the goal of economic competitiveness should be primarily to improve the welfare of American citizens, while also improving the standard of living globally and promoting American values. The group discussed a new vision of economic competitiveness that targets improvements in average living standards not just as a byproduct of a thriving national economy, but as a primary aim.

Globally, the United States finds many of its interests and values threatened by a shifting world order. Participants in Aspen highlighted how America's ability to promote its economic and national security interests are tied to the strength of the U.S. economy. A strong economy is also required to promote American values like freedom and democracy. These values will be threatened at home and abroad if America's role in the global order diminishes. American economic competitiveness must not only improve domestic living standards in the near term, but also protect the interests and values that are the foundation of American prosperity in the long term.

**2. The United States needs a more predictable policy environment to promote capital investment.**

Significant policy uncertainty in the United States is currently complicating the domestic business environment. The direction of policy frequently whipsaws across four-year political cycles. Even within those cycles, U.S. policy lacks predictability due to increasing reliance on executive action and mixed signals, messaging, and policies.

Business leaders in Aspen noted that the easy thing for companies to do within such an environment is to delay investments. One participant highlighted a private poll which estimated that the number of U.S. companies planning to expand capital investment in the last several months had halved due to increased policy uncertainty. Most companies will choose to wait out political uncertainty. This is particularly true in capital-intensive, immobile industries with long payback periods like energy and manufacturing; yet, the United States requires massive capital outlays in exactly these industries to remain competitive economically. Key areas of the economy like power generation, semiconductor production, and the buildout of data centers require huge investment. Too much capital is currently sitting on the sidelines due to unclear signals and fragile

policies. This underinvestment is likely to reduce the competitive position of the U.S. economy.

To accelerate investment, participants in Aspen highlighted the need to govern through legislation. Executive orders are often a positive start to catalyze action. But legislation is typically needed to send clear, durable signals to investors. This is particularly true in long-term, capital-intensive industries. Robust legislation requires political compromise which is complicated by the polarization of American politics. Participants in Aspen agreed that policymakers and civil society should at least try to build more bipartisan consensus on first principles for the economy.

Permitting reform is one area with a relatively encouraging amount of bipartisan consensus. A new permitting system is pivotal for the future of America's economy, and a significant amount of discussion in Aspen was dedicated to this topic. As one participant noted, the United States was "built on construction, but the country has now lost that, and it is too difficult to build things." It is important that citizens continue to hold the power to voice their views on infrastructure projects. But the current permitting and litigation process is far too slow, costly, and risky for investors, developers, and operators. The resulting costs from insufficient infrastructure development are shouldered by American citizens through negative externalities like rising housing costs, more traffic congestion, and increasingly volatile electricity prices.

Any significant solution to U.S. permitting will likely need to be legislated. Legislation can then be supplemented by a certain degree of deregulatory executive action. Executive action on its own is insufficient to address the immense number of projects throughout the country that need to move forward. Legislating a successful solution will require a move away from divisive, partisan politics. Some in Aspen noted how the current approach in Washington is "win-lose", rather than "win-win", with both political parties elevating their own victories rather than prioritizing the best solution for the country.

Participants highlighted various important pieces of the permitting puzzle. According to some, ambitious federal legislation could include things like categorical exclusions and limits on litigation. Various participants emphasized the importance of lawsuit reform. Permitting reform could also include more "green lights," or incentives for best-in-class environmental action, rather than relying solely on regulatory "red lights".

Additionally, participants were aligned on the importance of state and local permitting. As one participant noted, "if we only solve federal permitting, but not state and local permitting, we have not even solved half the problem." Another participant advocated for more aggressively using federal incentives, and federal funding in particular, to move states and localities to reform their permitting systems.

**3. The trajectory of broad-based, higher tariffs may pose challenges to America's geopolitical and economic position and would benefit from a more targeted approach.**

Many participants in Aspen acknowledged the value of tariffs as a policy tool but voiced significant concerns about the current direction of U.S. tariff policy. The meeting took place just before the United States announced numerous increases in tariffs on April 2, 2025, including a 10% baseline tariff on all imports and a series of much higher reciprocal tariffs. While hard data in the United States in Q1 2025 showed resilience, participants pointed to troubling trends in consumer confidence which, in March 2025, reached its lowest level since January 2021.<sup>1</sup> Various participants speculated that tariffs could lead to slower growth and higher inflation in the United States. There was also a discussion of the potential for a recession. Since the forum in Aspen, many analysts raised their estimates of a U.S. recession following the level of tariffs announced on April 2.<sup>2</sup>

Participants also discussed the longer-term implications of America's new direction on trade. Perhaps the largest concern voiced by participants was the effect of tariffs on U.S.-China competition. Today, the United States and China together account for about one-third of the global economy. International partnerships remain crucial for both countries' economic and geopolitical strength. China acknowledges this and is now the largest trade partner of more than 120 countries.<sup>3</sup> China's share of global trade has climbed significantly over the last decades and eclipses that of the United States.<sup>4</sup> Participants in Aspen were concerned that U.S. tariffs will only further reduce America's percent of global trade and deepen China's economic ties with the rest of the world. This is particularly likely given China's intention to expand its exports and global manufacturing footprint. If the United States closes itself off from the rest of the world, the concern was that it could leave a vacuum that China will fill.

The largest impacts may occur in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). These countries are primed to be key frontiers for producing goods, extracting commodities, and expanding consumption. Participants noted that financing plays a key role in EMDEs. As one participant said, "something is better than nothing" when it comes to investment. China's Belt and Road Initiative invested an estimated \$1.2 trillion

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<sup>1</sup> Mutikani, Lucia. "Rising fears of tariffs pummel US consumer confidence to four-year low." *Reuters*, March 25, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/us-consumer-confidence-deteriorates-further-march-2025-03-25/>

<sup>2</sup> J.P. Morgan. "The probability of a recession remains at 60%". Global Research Brief, April 15, 2025. <https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/economy/recession-probability>

<sup>3</sup> Ying Shan, Lee. "China de-linking talk is overdone and it's still key to the global economy, Asian Development Bank says." *CNBC*, February 25, 2024. <https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/26/china-still-top-trading-partner-for-many-countries-says-adb.html>

<sup>4</sup> Soltani, Ehsan. "Mapped: How China Overtook the U.S. in Global Trade (2000-2024)." *Visual Capitalist*, April 9, 2025. <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/how-china-overtook-u-s-in-global-trade-dominance-2000-2024/>



from 2013-2024, with much of that flowing into EMDEs.<sup>5</sup> The United States is yet to formulate a competitive response to the BRI that actively leverages U.S. capital markets. Some participants were optimistic about the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) playing a larger role abroad. To broaden its scope, the DFC may need more funding and looser restrictions on country eligibility, the scoring of equity investments, and the use of guarantees.

More broadly, participants cautioned that the United States must continue to protect and cultivate its alliance system. As one participant stated, “China has trading partners, not friends. We have friends, which has historically been important, but we are losing that.” In a purely anarchic, mercantile trading order, participants noted that China will likely outcompete the United States on cost and subsidies. America’s competitive advantage abroad comes from its innovation, values, allies, and sway over a rules-based order. These are strengths that have taken decades to build, should not be abandoned hastily, and cannot be rebuilt overnight, according to participants.

While participants agreed that tariffs have a role to play in U.S. economic strategy, several noted the need for a more focused approach. The United States currently has many stated objectives for applying tariffs. These include raising revenue, reducing trade deficits, creating more reciprocity, building leverage for foreign policy concessions, protecting national security, and reshoring manufacturing. It will be difficult to achieve all these goals at the same time. The sense was that a tighter list of objectives could lead to a more effective tariff strategy.

Some participants in Aspen were more positive about the political momentum for tariffs. According to their view, this momentum can be harnessed productively if it is guided by several principles. First, tariffs could be based on investigations of unfair trade practices to make them clearly legal and more objective. Second, tariffs could be implemented with allies to increase global buy-in and influence. Third, tariffs could be sequenced and have schedules that send clear signals to investors. Fourth, tariffs could only apply to a targeted list of strategic goods. This last point received significant discussion in Aspen. One participant noted that the U.S. government needs to further invest in its ability to identify and understand vulnerabilities. Not every supply chain is critical. Tariffs can follow limiting principles based on a good’s impact on national security, economic competitiveness, and welfare, as well as its exposure to market failures.

Several participants argued that the United States should not seek self-sufficiency for every good but should target minimum levels of resilience to reduce vulnerabilities. For certain strategic goods it may be in the national interest to pursue dominance, not just resilience. Both political parties can work together to reach consensus on where to focus trade policy and on targets for domestic and/or allied production. Policymakers can also work to further understand where policy may not be required. One business leader in Aspen outlined how their company diversified its sourcing from China to reduce risk.

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<sup>5</sup> Wang, Christoph Nedopil. “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2024.” *Green Finance & Development Center*, February 27, 2024.  
<https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2024/>



The company saw this new strategy as a form of insurance and incurred costs of 10-20% higher to source outside of China. Companies may often diversify on their own without the need for aggressive policy.

As the United States marches forward with a more muscular trade policy, it faces important questions around the future of trade agreements. Most participants in Aspen agreed that multilateral agreements can be valuable are often too difficult to negotiate with a consensus under the rules of the World Trade Organization. A potential solution may focus on plurilateral agreements with groups of countries. These plurilateral agreements could be sectoral, rather than broad free trade agreements. Sectoral agreements would target specific priority goods and sectors. They could have both offensive tools—like reducing tariffs, agreeing on standards, and aligning on procurement—and defensive tools—like harmonizing rules on foreign entities of concern, coordinating tariffs, and aligning export controls. One participant even mentioned the idea of having a concept like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Article 5 clause that “an attack on one is an attack on all” for countervailing duties. Plurilateral agreements as described above may be the most politically expedient way to operationalize the idea of friendshoring.

Most participants in Aspen agreed that the global trade system needs significant reform and that tariffs have a role to play in that reform. Participants also agreed, however, that tariffs should be differentiated and strategic, not blanket. Trade policy will need to be bold and ambitious. But it will also need to strengthen, not abandon, traditional American values and partners if it is to enhance the country’s economic competitiveness.

#### **4. The U.S. government will need to invest heavily in its innovation ecosystem, including national labs, universities, and early-stage technologies, to lead in strategic industries of the future.**

The United States retains crucial advantages—a dynamic private sector, robust capital markets, strong human and natural resources, and a unique innovation ecosystem—to lead in key industries of the future. Participants in Aspen highlighted the need to continue investing in these foundations of American economic competitiveness.

Participants generally aligned on the need for major government investment in innovation. Federal funding for research and development (R&D) has declined significantly over the last fifty years as a percent of GDP, discretionary spending, and the federal budget.<sup>6</sup> The United States has historically had a unique innovation ecosystem consisting of national labs, research universities, private companies, and capital markets, all of which rely on some degree of consistent government support. Various participants argued that the U.S. government must continue to invest heavily in innovation if the

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<sup>6</sup> American Association for the Advancement of Science. “Historical Trends in Federal R&D.” <https://www.aaas.org/programs/r-d-budget-and-policy/historical-trends-federal-rd>

country is to compete globally in inventing, commercializing, and dominating new technologies.

Workforce development is another key component for powering American innovation. Several participants in Aspen argued that the United States is currently losing ground on both K-12 education and workforce training. These areas must quickly be addressed to avoid a future stall in productivity.

The discussion in Aspen also covered the complexity of regulating new, rapidly changing industries like artificial intelligence (AI). Many participants were wary of overregulation. Several participants offered Europe as an example of how too much regulation can slow the development of critical industries. There was consensus, however, that basic “rules of the road” are required for new technologies. With AI, for example, clearer regulations on safety, privacy, and competition can guide the industry to develop in a way that is more likely to be optimal for the average American.

As innovative technologies move from development to commercialization, most will require state support. One participant in Aspen noted that almost every commercial form of energy today benefited from some level of state support. Shale production, for example, relied on public sector R&D, public-private partnerships, tax incentives, and a supportive legal framework. Similarly targeted industrial policy can support the competitiveness of technologies like small modular reactors, nuclear fusion, geothermal energy, and carbon capture, sequestration, and storage (CCS).

Participants in Aspen outlined various concepts to guide industrial policy. Some favored using targeted subsidies with sunset provisions. Subsidies could include tax credits and a patient pool of strategic government capital—perhaps through a public investment fund—to activate private markets which are not yet stepping into long-term, capital-intensive, risky projects. Most participants agreed that free markets are more efficient in allocating capital and any industrial policy needs clear targets and limits. Participants also noted that policymakers must remain humble about their ability to predict winning technologies and companies. When possible, industrial policy should strive toward incentives that are technologically agnostic.

The conversation on innovation inevitably had a strong focus on China. Participants assessed that China’s achievements in technology are real and impressive. One participant argued that China is on the verge of outpacing the United States on AI adoption. China is also massively ahead of America in scale and intellectual property for most clean energy technologies. In the semiconductor industry, China is following its blueprint from other industries by investing in commoditized goods and using that revenue to support investment in next-generation technologies.

Participants in Aspen took a nuanced view on China’s macroeconomic situation. There is clearly both good news and bad news for China, with the good news including continued innovation, exports to emerging markets, and a growing manufacturing footprint, while the bad news includes a struggling property sector and weak consumer sentiment. Various

participants speculated that the Chinese government will aggressively pull the levers on monetary and fiscal policy to weather upcoming challenges from U.S. trade policy and the domestic property sector.

Participants in Aspen generally advocated that the United States should focus more on becoming competitive at home rather than trying to slow China's progress. As one participant put it, America needs to follow the mantra of "run faster, don't trip the other guy." The best way to outcompete China is not to be more like China, but more like the United States. That requires investing in innovation and entrepreneurship, rather than fixating too heavily on protecting existing industries and recapturing old ones.

At the same time, participants in Aspen strongly agreed that some degree of export controls are necessary for trade with China; however, policymakers need to rigorously analyze the second-degree effects of potential trade policies. For example, one participant noted that restrictions on Huawei's use of Android in 2019 led to China's indigenous development of a new competing operating system. Rules meant to protect U.S. intellectual property for AI could similarly limit the market share of American companies and technologies in third markets, potentially leaving a vacuum for China. U.S. policy on strategic technologies needs to better identify supply chain chokepoints. It also requires more thorough analysis of the role that decoupling will play in slowing, or potentially accelerating, China's technology development and diffusion.

**5. Rising electricity demand and economic competitiveness are intertwined challenges that U.S. policymakers, industry, and civil society can address through a wide mix of solutions, including incentivizing innovation in the power sector, expanding gas-fired generation equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and adopting a cautiously optimistic approach to nuclear energy.**

Electricity demand in the United States will grow more quickly over the coming years than it has in the last decades. Average annual load growth is expected to increase by 3% from 2024-2029, a level not seen since the 1980s.<sup>7</sup> Everyday Americans and the entire U.S. economy depend on affordable, accessible, and reliable electricity. Participants in Aspen proposed that the United States needs a decade of action in creating electrons to fuel a competitive domestic economy. The implications may be particularly critical for the AI race between the United States and China. AI competitiveness is determined by access to data, computation, and energy. Today, energy is a primary concern for most American AI companies. One participant noted that access to energy is the key variable for dictating where companies build data centers. The United States will need to meet the challenge of load growth if it is to lead in AI over the coming decades.

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<sup>7</sup> Wilson, John D., Zach Zimmerman, and Rob Gramlich. "Strategic Industries Surging: Driving US Power Demand." *Grid Strategies*, December 2024.  
<https://gridstrategiesllc.com/wp-content/uploads/National-Load-Growth-Report-2024.pdf>

Numerous participants in Aspen stressed the need for more innovation in the electricity sector to expand the grid affordably, reliably, and quickly. Some participants believe that there is not enough competition in the electricity sector. This camp argued that regulated utilities need a new incentive structure to reward innovation and adoption of solutions like grid-enhancing technologies. One participant stated that more innovation is occurring where there is deregulation (e.g., Texas) or where regulated utilities risk losing their customers (e.g., Georgia). The participant posited that allowing utilities to build transmission lines across states could boost competition and innovation.

Perspectives on regulated electricity markets were not unanimous. One participant noted that deregulated markets may be good for industrial customers, but bad for retail customers, and that partially deregulating markets could be even worse. The participant also argued that deregulated utilities are not always innovating more than regulated utilities. Regulated utilities may also be a more natural partner for large, risky generation projects although these projects may have to force their way into deregulated markets since those markets can move quicker. Ultimately, there may not be political appetite for completely breaking up utilities, meaning any change will likely be incremental.

Higher load growth has led to a resurgence of an “all of the above” approach to electricity generation in the United States. Some participants in Aspen were in favor of building more gas-fired generation equipped with combined cycle technology and/or CCS solutions. Combined cycle power plants can be a cost-competitive option that emits less carbon per kilowatt produced and provides important reliability, dispatchability, and flexibility. Gas with CCS may be one of the paths of least resistance to meet load growth, but currently faces challenges due to pushback from some environmental groups and a lengthy interconnection process.

Participants in Aspen were guardedly optimistic about the potential of nuclear power. Various participants noted that nuclear fission is not a silver bullet in the short term and will likely only serve as an important supplement to a range of other generation sources. Long-term challenges also remain to lower capital costs, improve operating efficiencies, and address concerns around waste disposal. Nonetheless, participants were optimistic about advances in new technologies like small modular reactors. They also noted that strong bipartisan support for nuclear energy provides an advantage over other renewable and fossil fuel sources that currently find themselves caught in the crosshairs of partisan politics.

## **Agenda**

### **Sunday, March 23, 2025**

*Opening Reception and Dinner*

### **Monday, March 24, 2025**

*Welcome Remarks*

*Session 1: Briefing Room: American Economic Competitiveness in the Global Context*

*Session 2: Tariffs and Trade*

*Session 3: Advanced Technology and Energy*

*Forum Reception and Dinner*

### **Tuesday, March 25, 2025**

*Session 4: The United States and China: Balancing Competition, Collaboration, and Conflict*

*Session 5: Supply Chain Resilience, Diversification, and Risk*

*Session 6: Industrial Policy in Light of Geopolitical Realities*

*Session 7: Role of Regulation and Competition Policy*

*Forum Reception and Dinner*

### **Wednesday, March 26, 2025**

*Session 8: Wrap Up | Finding Common Ground on American Economic Competitiveness*

*Concluding Remarks*

## Participant List

\*Attending Virtually

1. **Wally Adeyemo**, former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. Department of the Treasury
2. **Grant Aldonas**, Principal Managing Director, Split Rock International, Inc.
3. **Skanda Amarnath**, Executive Director, Employ America
4. **Al Armendariz**, Industrial Initiative Director, Climate Imperative Foundation
5. **Abigail Ball**, Executive Director, American Compass
6. **Greg Bertelsen**, Chief Executive Officer, Climate Leadership Council
7. **Karan Bhatia**, Vice President and Global Head of Government Affairs & Public Policy, Google
8. **Alex Brill**, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
9. **Kent Chandler**, Resident Senior Fellow, Energy and Environmental Policy, R Street Institute
10. **Joyce Chang**, Chair of Global Research, J.P. Morgan
11. **\*John Corrigan**, Senior Director for Trade and Industrial Strategy, Silverado Policy Accelerator
12. **Brian Deese**, former Director of the National Economic Council, The White House (**Co-Chair**)
13. **\*Paula Dobriansky**, former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs and Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
14. **\*Courtney Durham Shane**, Senior Officer, Climate Mitigation, The Pew Charitable Trusts
15. **Dan Esty**, Hillhouse Professor of Environmental Law and Policy, Yale University
16. **\*Xan Fishman**, Senior Managing Director, Energy Program, Bipartisan Policy Center
17. **Tyler Goodspeed**, Chief Economist, ExxonMobil Corporation
18. **Jennifer Granholm**, former Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy
19. **Garret Graves**, former Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives
20. **Aliya Haq**, former Vice President, U.S. Policy and Advocacy, Breakthrough Energy
21. **Jeremy Harrell**, Chief Executive Officer, ClearPath, Inc.
22. **Jennifer Harris**, Director, Economy and Society Initiative, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
23. **Keith Hennessey**, Chief Financial Officer, Bechtel Group, Inc.
24. **Jennifer A. Hillman**, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center
25. **Maureen Hinman**, Co-Founder and Chairman, Silverado Policy Accelerator
26. **David R. Hill**, Executive Vice President of Energy, Bipartisan Policy Center
27. **John Hopkins**, Chief Executive Officer, NuScale Power
28. **Jonathan Kanter**, former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
29. **Sally Laing**, Partner, International Trade, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
30. **Rich Lesser**, Global Chairman, Boston Consulting Group
31. **Chris Liddell**, former Deputy Chief of Staff, The White House
32. **Laura Lightbody**, Director, Energy Modernization Program, The Pew Charitable Trusts
33. **\*Oliver McPherson-Smith**, Energy Analyst
34. **Yasmine Moezinia**, Program Director, Climate Finance, Sequoia Climate Foundation
35. **L. Daniel Mullaney**, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council



36. **Jonas Nahm**, Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Senior Advisor, Macro Advisory Partners
37. **Scott Nathan**, former Chief Executive Officer, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation
38. **Nazak Nikakhtar**, Chair, National Security Practice, Partner, Wiley Rein LLP
39. **\*David Paoletta**, former Manager, U.S. Policy and Advocacy, Breakthrough Energy
40. **Luke Pardue**, Policy Director, Economic Strategy Group, Aspen Institute
41. **Michael Polsky**, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Invenergy LLC
42. **Rob Portman**, former United States Senator and United States Trade Representative (*Co-Chair*)
43. **Rich Powell**, Chief Executive Officer, Clean Energy Buyers Association
44. **Dan W. Reicher**, Senior Research Scholar, Stanford Doerr School
45. **Jeffrey Rissman**, Senior Director, Industry, Energy Innovation
46. **Veronique de Rugy**, George Gibbs Chair in Political Economy, Mercatus Center, George Mason University
47. **JC Sandberg**, Chief Policy Officer, American Clean Power
48. **Ben Schwartz**, Infrastructure Partnerships and Policy Lead, OpenAI
49. **Daleep Singh**, former Deputy National Security Advisor, International Economics, U.S. National Security Council
50. **\*Matthew Slaughter**, Dean, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College
51. **\*Sarah Stewart**, Chief Executive Officer, Silverado Policy Accelerator
52. **Scott Strazik**, Chief Executive Officer, GE Vernova
53. **Barbara Weisel**, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific
54. **Clete Willems**, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
55. **Mike Wirth**, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Chevron Corporation

## **Staff**

1. **Nikki DeVignes**, Director, Operations, Energy & Environment Program, Aspen Institute
2. **Greg Gershuny**, Executive Director and Vice President, Energy & Environment Program, The Aspen Institute
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